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ESTATES AND TRUSTS
MARGARET B. ALCOCK*

This section of the Survey deals with New Mexico appellate court cases
which considered issues of estate and trust law. These issues included
questions of jurisdiction, advancements, undue influence, creditors' claims,
and the right of a former spouse to a decedent's death benefits. Most of
the decisions involved the interpretation of New Mexico's Probate Code'
which applies to the affairs of decedents dying on or after July 1, 1976.2
Two cases dealt with the estates of decedents dying before the effective
date of the Probate Code and the courts decided them under prior law. 3
Although pre-Probate Code estates are becoming increasingly infrequent,
the law governing their administration contains no statute of limitations
on the filing of probate, 4 and New Mexico practitioners must still be
prepared to apply former law in appropriate circumstances. 5
ADVANCEMENTS

In In re Estate of Martinez,6 the court of appeals dealt with the issue
of advancements. The case involved several procedural questions resulting from a fifteen-year delay from the date administration proceedings
began in 1966 to the date the case reached the court of appeals in 1981.
*J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law, 1983.
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§45-1-101 to 45-7-401 (1978).
2. The effective date of the Probate Code is not found in the 1978 statutory compilation; it appears
in 1975 N.M. Laws ch. 257, § 10-101, which provides:
A. The effective date of the provisions of the Probate Code is July 1, 1976.
B. The Probate Code applies to the affairs of decedents dying on or after the effective
date of the Probate Code, and to matters of missing persons, protected persons,
minors and incapacitated persons commenced on or after the effective date of the
Probate Code.
C. Nothing in the Probate Code shall affect the right or remedy of either party, or
change the rules of evidence or procedure, in any pending case.
3. In re Estate of Martinez, 96 N.M. 619, 633 P.2d 727 (Ct. App.), cert. denied. 97 N.M. 140,
637 P.2d 571 (1981), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 6-12; In re Will of Hamilton, 97
N.M. 111, 637 P.2d 542 (1981), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 13-19.
4. The only statute of limitation under pre-1976 probate law is a six-year limitation on the rights
of creditors with regard to real estate owned by decedents whose estates were not subject to administration. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-8-4 (1953). For a discussion of delayed administrations under the
old probate statutes, see A. Poldervaart, New Mexico Probate Manual §40 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as Poldervaart].
5. See Poldervaart, supra note 4, for a discussion of when the administration of a pre-Probate
Code estate may become necessary.
6. 96 N.M. 619, 633 P.2d 727 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 97 N.M. 140, 637 P.2d 571 (1981).
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Because the decedent died before the effective date of the Probate Code,
the court decided the advancement issue under prior law.7
The substantive issue in Martinez was whether real property given by
the decedent during his lifetime to one of his sons should be considered
an advancement in dividing the decedent's estate among all of his children. The present Probate Code treats a gift as an advancement only if
it is declared as such in a contemporaneous writing signed by the donor
and acknowledged by the donee. 8 In contrast, the old common law doctrine, as set out by the court in Martinez, raises the presumption that a
parent intends a lifetime gift to his child to be an advancement against
the child's inheritance. 9 In order to overcome the presumption, the child
must introduce some evidence to support a contrary finding.' 0 If the child
is successful, the presumption disappears and it then becomes the plaintiff's burden to establish the decedent's intention to have his gift treated
as an advancement."
In Martinez, the defendant introduced evidence at trial indicating that
the gift of property was intended as defendant's share of his deceased
mother's estate. The court accepted this as sufficient evidence to overcome
the presumption of an advancement. Although it was not discussed in the
court's opinion, legal title to the property in question apparently was held
by the decedent at the time the gift was made, and the decedent's potential
estate was therefore depleted by the value of that gift. It is not clear why
the court assumed that because the decedent originally obtained the property from the estate of his first wife, defendant's mother, the gift was
any less an advancement against the decedent's own estate. Other testimony given at trial supported the view that the gift was intended as part
of the defendant's total inheritance, rather than as a special gift of property
once belonging to his mother. This testimony was ruled to be hearsay
and inadmissible by the court of appeals. As a result, the court's decision
rested solely on the rather ambiguous testimony of the defendant and his
sister that the property, legally owned by their father, was defendant's
inheritance from his mother. Without more substantial evidence, the court's
holding against advancement was not well founded. The decision does
indicate that the quantum of evidence required to overcome the old common law presumption of advancement may be minimal.' 2
7. See supra notes 4-5.
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-110 (1978).
9. The rationale supporting the presumption for advancement is that a parent's affection for his
children is usually of equal degree and the parent would not wish to favor one child over another.
96 N.M. at 623, 633 P.2d at 731.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 624, 633 P.2d at 732. Because administration proceedings were filed before the adoption
of the rules of evidence in 1973, the Martinez court applied New Mexico common law.
12. Had N.M. R. Evid. 301 on presumptions been in effect, the outcome of the case might have

Spring 1983]

ESTATES AND TRUSTS

CLAIMS

In re Will of Hamilton 3 was the second case involving the estate of a
decedent dying before the effective date of the Probate Code. The decedent, W. A. Hamilton, died in 1968. His will divided the residue of
his estate among his three children and nominated one of the children,

Jack, as executor of the estate. The other two devisees raised several
objections to Jack's administration at the time the final account and report
was filed in 1976. The major objections were to payments Jack had made
to himself as reimbursement for his personal claims against the estate.
The court held that the payments were improper4 because Jack had not
formally filed the claims as required by statute. '
Although decided under prior law, the court's position would be the
same with respect to a personal representative who reimburses himself
for claims against an estate without following the procedure set out in
the Probate Code.' 5 Hamilton serves as a reminder that a personal representative must be careful to keep his alternate identities as fiduciary,
heir, and creditor of an estate separate. He should always understand in
which capacity he is acting in order to insure that all of his statutory
responsibilities have been met.
UNDUE INFLUENCE

Other objections to the executor's final account and report in Hamilton
resulted in the court finding that Jack had exercised undue influence over
been different. See the discussion of In re Estate of Padilla, 97 N.M. 508, 641 P.2d 539 (Ct. App.
1982), in Hertz, Evidence, post at 407, which sets out the legislative background and present status
of the evidentiary rules on presumptions in New Mexico. Martinez is the first New Mexico case to
deal with the issue of advancements in the context of an intestacy proceeding. Two New Mexico
cases have addressed the subject in connection with the construction of wills: In re Williams' Will,
71 N.M. 39, 376 P.2d 3 (1962); Sylvanus v. Pruett, 36 N.M. 112, 9 P.2d 142 (1932). Prior to the
adoption of the Probate Code, New Mexico was the only state in the country which did not have a
statute on advancements. Ingram and Parnall, The Perils of Intestate Succession in New Mexico and
Related Will Problems, 7 Nat. Resources J. 555, 595 (1967).
13. 97 N.M. 111, 637 P.2d 542 (1981).
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-8-3 (1953), as quoted by the court, provides that -[a]ll claims against
the estate of deceased persons notfiled. . . within six [6] months from the date of the first publication
" (emphasis by the court). 97
of notice of the appointment of executor . . . shall be barred ..
N.M. at 115, 637 P.2d at 546. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the requirements of this
section were mandatory in In re Lander's Estate, 34 N.M. 431, 283 P. 49 (1929). The court there
stated that neither the heirs nor the administrator had power to waive the requirements: "[the statute
is mandatory." Id. at 435, 283 P. at 50.
15. Section 45-3-803 of the Probate Code corresponds to § 31-8-3 of the 1953 compilation. The
present Code bars all claims against an estate which are not presented within two months after the
date of the first publication of notice to creditors or within three years after the decedent's death if
notice to creditors has not been published. Oney v. Odom, 95 N.M. 640, 624 P.2d 1037 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186 (1981), declared § 45-3-803 to be mandatory. In Oney,
the court held that claims not timely presented are barred. The court further held that the district
court does not have the power to extend the period for presentment set out in the Code. 95 N.M.
at 643, 624 P.2d at 1040. See also Lebeck, Estates and Trusts, Survey of New Mexico Law: 19801981, 12 N.M. L. Rev. 363, 367 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Lebeck].
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his co-devisees. Jack had secured the signatures of the other two devisees
on an agreement settling Jack's personal claims against the estate by
means of an unequal distribution of estate assets: $56,000 to Jack; $6,000
each to his co-devisees. The co-devisees raised objections to the agreement at the time the final account and report were filed. One devisee
claimed that he had a history of alcoholism and did not remember signing
the agreement. The other claimed that Jack had obtained her signature
by means of threats and intimidation. The trial court found that there was
no evidence of fraud or undue influence and accepted the final account
and report. The supreme court reversed on the issue of undue influence,
holding that Jack's fiduciary relationship as executor and his strong domination over the other devisees with regard to estate matters raised a
presumption of undue influence.
In dealing with the issue of undue influence, the court in Hamilton did
not distinguish between Jack's separate identities as executor and devisee,
as it had distinguished between his identities as executor and creditor
when addressing the claims issue. ' 6 The court held that when a transaction
between an executor and the beneficiaries under a will is questioned, "the
executor has the burden of showing that he acted in good faith. "'7 Technically, the agreement in question was not a transaction between the
executor and the beneficiaries of W. A. Hamilton's estate.' 8 It was a
private agreement among the beneficiaries altering the pattern of distribution set out in the will.' 9 Consequently, it might be questioned whether
Jack should have borne the burden of proving that he had acted in good
faith with regard to the two other devisees, and whether the fiduciary or
confidential relationship necessary to a finding of undue influence should
have been presumed because Jack occupied the position of executor as
well as that of devisee. Although it appears from the opinion that there
16. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
17. 97 N.M. at 114, 637 P.2d at 545.
18. Id.
19. The agreement identified the parties to the agreement as the "heirs and beneficiaries under
the Last Will and Testament of W. A. Hamilton, deceased." Record at 255, Hamilton. Jack Hamilton
signed the agreement in his individual capacity as a devisee under his father's will. There was no
indication in the agreement that he was acting ir the capacity of executor. Id.
It is interesting to note that under the present Probate Code a personal representative has no
authority to make objection to an agreement among heirs or devisees altering distribution of an
estate:
[Clompetent successors may agree among themselves to alter the interests, shares
or amounts to which they are entitled under the will of the decedent, or under
the laws of intestacy, in any way that they provide in a written contract executed
by all who are affected by its provisions. The personal representative shall abide
by the terms of the agreement subject to his obligation to administer the estate
for the benefit of creditors, to pay all taxes and costs of administration, and to
carry out the responsibilities of his office for the benefit of any successors of the
decedent who are not parties.
N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-3-912 (1978).
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were grounds for invalidating the agreement in Hamilton, such invalidation might more properly have been based on the contract principles
of duress and lack of intent, rather than a finding of undue influence.
In In re Will of Ferrill,20 the court of appeals addressed a more common
form of undue influence-that of the beneficiary of a will upon the testator.
The court held that the will of Hazel Cash Ferrill, which disinherited her
family in favor of a married couple who had cared for the testatrix during
the eight months before her death, was the product of undue influence
and therefore invalid. The decision was based on a finding of "several
suspicious circumstances" existing in conjunction with a 2confidential
relationship between the testatrix and the new beneficiaries. '
Hazel Cash Ferrill died of cancer in December 1979 at the age of 82.
She and her sister lived on Hazel's ranch from May to December of that
year and were cared for by Joe and Billie Thorp. The Thorps acted at
the request of their employer, a neighboring rancher, and he continued
to pay the Thorps' salaries. In July 1979, Hazel executed a new will
disinheriting her grandson and naming the Thorps as the primary beneficiaries of her estate. The estate was valued at between $875,000 and
$1,000,000. After Hazel's death, her grandson contested the admission
of the will to probate. The jury found that the will was the product of
undue influence exerted on the testatrix by Joe Thorp.
In reviewing the case, the court of appeals first established the existence
of a confidential relationship between Joe Thorp and Hazel. The court
defined such a relationship as one in which "trust and confidence is
reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another." 22 It then
rejected Thorp's position that a presumption of undue influence could
arise only if it was also shown that he occupied a dominant position in
his relationship with Hazel. The court held that the existence of a confidential relationship in conjunction with an unspecified number of suspicious circumstances, domination being only one, is sufficient to give
rise to the presumption. The five circumstances enumerated by the court
as "suspicious" were: (1) the testator was old and in a weakened physical
or mental condition; (2) there was a lack of consideration for the bequest;
(3) the disposition of the property was unnatural or unjust; (4) the beneficiary participated in procuring the will; and (5) the beneficiary dominated the testator.23 The court concluded that the first three of these five
circumstances were present at the time Hazel executed her will.
In examining the court's reasoning, the third circumstance was clearly
the most important in this case. The court believed that the disinheritance
20. 97 N.M. 383, 640 P.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed,
(1982).
21. 97 N.M. at 387, 640 P.2d at 493.
22. Id.
23. Id.

-

N.M.

P.2d

-
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of Hazel's grandson in favor of two relatively recent acquaintances was
unfair. 24 Any other reading of the case would create a situation within
which a number of wills would be potentially invalid due to the presence
of undue influence. First, it can be expected that most testators make
bequests only to those in whom they have trust and confidence. Second,
many testators are old and in poor health. Finally, a bequest or devise
is, by definition, a gift.25 Few gifts are made in return for any consideration
other than love and affection or, "trust and confidence ... in the integrity
and fidelity of another." 2 6 The most damning of the five circumstances
are the last two, that the beneficiary participated in procuring the will
and that the beneficiary dominated the testator. The court in Ferrill admitted that neither of these circumstances existed in relation to Hazel's
will.
The holding in Ferrill regarding the factors necessary to prove undue
influence deviates from earlier cases. Despite the court's assertion that
neither domination of the testator by the beneficiary nor the beneficiary's
involvement in procuring the will is required for a finding of undue
influence, every case cited by the court did, in fact, contain evidence of
at least one of these two circumstances.2 7 As the court noted in Galvan
v. Miller,2" "not all influence is 'undue' influence. The mere fact that
influence is exerted upon a testator does not of itself vitiate the testator's
will or require that it be set aside or denied probate." 2 9 The fact that
Hazel Ferrill was old and in poor health, and that she chose to leave her
property away from the natural objects of her bounty, might have war24. The court noted that Hazel had raised her grandson, Don, and that he had helped her in her
business activities while he was growing up. It was also noted that Hazel had lived with Don and
his wife for two months during 1978. From these facts the court determined that "the jury could
have concluded that the disposition of the will was unnatural or unjust." 97 N.M. at 388, 640 P.2d
at 494.
25. A bequest is a "gift by will of personal property"; a devise is a "gift of real property by last
will and testament of the donor." Black's Law Dictionary 145, 407 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
26. 97 N.M. at 387, 640 P.2d at 493.
27. Galvan v. Miller, 79 N.M. 540, 445 P.2d 961 (1968) (testator was dominated by the principal
beneficiary); Hummer v. Betenbough, 75 N.M. 274, 404 P.2d 110 (1965) (testatrix was dominated
and coerced by principal beneficiaries; beneficiaries participated in procuring the will); Ostertag v.
Donovan, 65 N.M. 6, 331 P.2d 355 (1958) (in gift of stock from elderly patient to her doctor, the
doctor assisted the donor in filling out the endorsement on the stock certificates); Calloway v. Miller,
58 N.M. 124, 266 P.2d 365 (1954) (beneficiary obtained a power of attorney from testator, transferred
testator's bank accounts to joint accounts in a local bank, and procured testator's will); Brown v.
Cobb, 53 N.M. 169, 204 P.2d 264 (1949) (lessees arranged drafting of inequitable lease and procured
signature of elderly lessor, preventing lessor from obtaining disinterested legal advice); Salazar v.
Manderfield, 47 N.M. 64, 134 P.2d 544 (1943) (grantees procured signature of grantor on deed,
failing to disclose all facts concerning the deed); Trigg v. Trigg, 37 N.M. 296, 22 P.2d 119 (1933)
(wife procured husband's signature on deed through constant "nagging"); Cardenas v. Ortiz, 29
N.M. 633, 226 P. 418 (1924) (grantees procured deed from elderly relatives who depended on
grantee for advice).
28. 79 N.M. 540, 445 P.2d 961 (1968).
29. Id. at 544, 445 P.2d at 965.
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ranted a challenge to her testamentary capacity. Without more, these facts
should not have sustained a finding of undue influence. As a result of the
decision in Ferrill,it has become virtually impossible for a testator who
is old and infirm to dispose of his property in a manner that a judge or
jury might interpret as unnatural or unjust. 3" This creates serious problems
in will drafting and reemphasizes the need for attorneys to substantiate
both the capacity and the motives of an elderly testator when drafting a
will which provides for an unusual disposition of the testator's estate.
PRETERMITTED CHILDREN
The decision in In re Estate of Padilla,3 in which the court of appeals
interpreted the Probate Code on the issue of pretermitted children ,32 also
reflects concern for the protection of the family. In Padilla, the court held
that a statement in a printed form will which read: "I declare that I have
no children whom I have omitted to name or provide for herein," 33 was
ineffective against the claim of the testator's illegitimate son. The court
based its decision on a strict interpretation of section 45-2-302 of the
Probate Code. Under that section, a child who has been omitted from
his parent's will is still entitled to receive a share in the parent's estate
equal to that which he would have received if the parent had died intestate,
unless "it appears from the will that the omission was intentional." 34 The
30. A study of 220 California cases involving will contests determined that juries found for will
contestants more than 75% of the time. Note, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 91, 92 (1953). In discussing the
failure of trial judges to grant judgments n.o.v. in such cases, the author noted that the equities
usually appear to be on the side of the contestants: "When ... the decedent has disappointed the
natural ... objects of hisbounty, the equities in their favor are strong .... If juries are dominated
by their natural sympathies in this type of litigation, it may be that trial judges are swayed sometimes
by a sense of justice." Id. at 96. The tendency of juries to find in favor of disinherited children has
sometimes been troublesome for the courts. In Heidman v. Kelsey, 19 Ill. 2d 258, 166 N.E.2d 596
(1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 869 (1960), the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a decree in favor
of an only child who was devised a one-sixth share in her father's estate:
We are reviewing not the first trial, but the fourth. To be sure, this fact has made
us increasingly reluctant to set our view of the evidence against that of three
juries. But it also makes us increasingly reluctant to remand the cause for another
trial with the prospect that we will again be called upon to reverse a jury finding
and remand for another trial. "This court recognizes the tendency of juries to
look for an excuse to hold invalid a will making an unequal division of the
46,
De Marco v. McGill, 402 I11.
testator's property among his children.
51, 83 N.E.2d 313, 316.
2d at
, 166 N.E. at 600.
19 Ill.
31. 97 N.M. 508, 641 P.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1982).
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-302 (1978).
33. 97 N.M. at 512, 641 P.2d at 543.
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-302(A)(1) (1978). The complete text of subsection A of the statute
reads as follows:
A. If a testator fails to name or provide in his will for any of his children born
or adopted before or after the execution of his will, the omitted child or his issue
receives a share in the estate equal in value to that which he would have received
if the testator had died intestate unless:
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court held that the language of the statute does not allow the introduction
of extrinsic evidence indicating the testator's intent. In order to disinherit
of the intent to disinherit must appear on the face
a child, an indication
35
of the will itself.
The testator, Joseph Padilla, executed his last will and testament in
1968. At that time, Padilla had a twenty-six-year-old illegitimate son,
Richard Sanchez. Padilla was aware of Richard's existence and had orally
acknowledged the relationship between them, but Padilla did not mention
or provide for Richard in the will. When Padilla died in 1978, two
challenges were raised to the probate of his will. The testator's two sisters
challenged the validity of the will's execution. Richard Sanchez challenged the will based on his right as a pretermitted child to take against
the will. The trial court upheld the will against both sets of claimants.
The court of appeals affirmed as to the execution issue 36 and reversed as
to Richard's claim under New Mexico's pretermission statute.
As an illegitimate child, Richard's claim depended on a preliminary
finding as to his paternity. Under the Probate Code there are three ways
in which an illegitimate child may establish his paternity: (1) by a marriage
ceremony participated in by the natural parents before or after the child's
birth, regardless of the validity of the ceremony; (2) by a written instrument signed by the father, provided that the instrument shows on its face
that it was signed with the intent of recognizing the child as an heir; and
(3) by an adjudication of paternity made before the death of the father
or established thereafter by a preponderance of the evidence.37 The paternity of Richard Sanchez was established by adjudication after Joseph
Padilla's death. Richard was then in a position to inherit his father's entire
estate under New Mexico's pretermission statute, effectively blocking
disposition of the testator's property according to the terms of his will.
In Padilla, the testator was aware of his illegitimate son's existence
and had orally acknowledged Richard as his son. The case raises a ques(1) it appears from the will that the omission was intentional;
(2) when the will was executed, the testator had one or more children and
devised substantially all his estate to the other parent of the omitted child; or
(3) the testator provided for the child by transfer outside the will and the intent
that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of
the testator or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence.
35. This is a significant change from the law on pretermitted children which existed prior to
adoption of the Probate Code. See Flickinger, Intestate Succession and Wills Law: The New Probate
Code, 6 N.M.L. Rev. 25, 53-55 (1975), setting out the differences between New Mexico's former
statutes and the Code.
36. 97 N.M. at 511, 641 P.2d at 542. The court held that under the evidence rule on presumptions,
N.M. R. Evid. 301, Padilla's will was valid, despite the fact that the testator and the witnesses had
not complied with statutory requirements of execution. For an analysis of the court's decision on
this issue, see Hertz, Evidence, post at 407.
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-2-109(B) (1978).
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tion, however, as to whether it is possible for a testator to guard against
having his testamentary wishes thwarted by a child of whom he is unaware. It appears from the decision in Padilla that he cannot. The court
stated very clearly that "an affirmative, not negative, indication of intention must appear on the face of the Will" 38 in order to avoid application
of section 45-2-302.
DEATH BENEFITS
In In re Estate of Schleis,39 the supreme court held that a divorce decree
does not automatically sever a former spouse's interest in an insurance
policy of which she is the designated beneficiary. In Schleis, the decedent
had taken out two term life insurance policies during his marriage and
designated his wife as beneficiary. The couple was divorced a few months
before the decedent's death. When the former wife claimed the proceeds
of the two policies, the personal representative of decedent's estate objected, claiming that because the divorce decree awarded the decedent
all personal property in his possession, his former wife was automatically
divested of her interest in the policies. The supreme court upheld the
wife's right to the proceeds.
The court distinguished the facts in Schleis from those in Romero v.
Melendez,4 0 relied upon by the personal representative. In Romero, the
divorce decree specifically divested the former spouse of all interest in
the decedent's insurance policies, "including the expectancy as a beneficiary." 4 1The Schleis court held that when a divorce decree merely grants
42
ownership of the policy to one spouse, the rule in Harris v. Harris
applies. Under Harris, the owner spouse must take the steps set out in
the policy for a change of beneficiary in order to divest his former spouse
of her right to the proceeds.43 In Schleis, the terms of the insurance policies
had not been introduced at trial. The supreme court adopted its own twopart test and required evidence of a clear expression of intent to change
38. 97 N.M. at 513, 641 P.2d at 544.
39. 97 N.M. 561, 642 P.2d 164 (1982). For further discussion of this case, see Kelsey & Siegel,
Domestic Relations, ante at 379.
40. 83 N.M. 776, 498 P.2d 305 (1972).
41. Id. at 780, 498 P.2d at 309.
42. 83 N.M. 441, 493 P.2d 407 (1972).
43. In Harris, the supreme court reversed a trial court decision which divided the proceeds of
two life insurance policies equally between the decedent's former wife and his estate. The court
held that the decedent's failure to change the beneficiary designation on the insurance policies resulted
in the entire amount of the proceeds going to his former wife:
Decedent, being the owner of half of the policies, had the right to dispose of his
half interest in the proceeds as he pleased. Since he did not change the beneficiary
prior to his death, however, he exercised the right in favor of the appellant. . ..
Her divorce from defendant had no effect upon her status as beneficiary.
83 N.M. at 443, 493 P.2d at 409.
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the beneficiary, coupled with reasonable efforts to effect the change.
Because there was no indication of any action on the part of the decedent
with regard to the policies, the court held that the personal representative
had not met the requirements for divesting the decedent's former wife of
her rights under the policies.
It is worth noting that the court based its conclusion solely on contract
principles; there was no claim that the decedent's former wife had a
community property interest in the insurance policies. The court stated
at the beginning of its opinion that the policies were for term insurance
and that the period of coverage purchased with community funds had
ended before the decedent's death. As a result, the former wife's successful claim to the proceeds rested entirely on her position as designated
beneficiary.
JURISDICTION
In re Estate of Ruther" raised the question of whether a jury trial
deciding the validity of a decedent's will may be held in a district court
other than that which has jurisdiction over the probate proceedings. Two
separate probate proceedings were filed for the estate of Phillip Ruther:
the first was an informal testacy proceeding filed in Bernalillo County by
Rubal Ruther; the second was a formal testacy proceeding filed in Curry
County by Richard Ruther three months later. Although the court in
Bernalillo County found that venue and jurisdiction were in Bernalillo
and ordered a consolidation of all proceedings, it set a hearing on Richard's petition for formal probate of the decedent's will in Curry County.
Rubal appealed the subsequent admission of the will, claiming that once
the court had entered its order that venue and jurisdiction were in Bernalillo County, trial could not be held in Curry County.
The court of appeals affirmed the admission of decedent's will in the
proceeding in Curry County. Section 45-1-303(C) 45 authorizes transfer of
a proceeding to another court if the court having jurisdiction finds that
the transfer is "in the interest of justice. " 4 6 There was no such finding
in the Bemalillo County District Court's order setting the matter for trial
44. 96 N.M. 462, 631 P.2d 1330 (Ct. App. 1981).
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-1-303(C) (1978).
46. Id. The interpretation of § 45-1-303 depends on N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-3-201 (1978), which
determines which court has venue:
A. Venue for the first informal or formal testacy or appointment proceedings
after a decedent's death is:
(1) in the county where the decedent had his domicile at the time of his death;
B. Venue for all subsequent proceedings is in the place where the initial proceeding occurred, unless the initial proceeding has been transferred as provided
in Section 1-303 [45-1-303 NMSA 1978]. ...
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in Curry County. In fact, the order was issued one week before the final
determination of jurisdiction. The court of appeals glossed over the omission by emphasizing Rubal's failure to object to the absence of a finding
that transfer to Curry County was in the interest of justice. The court
concluded that "such finding was implicit in the Order. . . .
Ruther is of interest primarily because it is one of the few cases interpreting the procedural statutes of the Probate Code. A second issue in
Ruther concerned the right of a party to demand a jury trial in formal
testacy proceedings. As the court pointed out, section 45-1-306 of the
Code clearly provides such a right.4' There are several sections in the
Probate Code governing procedural matters; attorneys should not assume
that principles of equity necessarily apply to all probate proceedings.
COMMUNITY LIEN
The article on estates and trusts in the last Survey issue49 discussed the
court of appeals' decision in Portillo v. Shappie.50 Portillo upheld the
then-prevailing rule in New Mexico that the use of community funds to
enhance the value of a spouse's separate property creates a community
lien against the property in the amount of the community funds expended.
The supreme court granted certiorari and during this Survey year reversed
the court of appeals decision." The supreme court held that when the
community has invested labor as well as funds in improving the separate
property of one of the spouses, the community lien is not limited to the
value of such labor and funds. Instead, the lien will be measured by the
enhancement in value of the property as a result of the improvements.
The supreme court's decision in Portillo modified a long-standing rule
of New Mexico community property law. Whether the case is an aberration or signals a real change in the court's application of community
property principles remains to be seen. 52

47. 96 N.M. at 465, 631 P.2d at 1333.
48. 96 N.M. at 464, 631 P.2d at 1332. The full text of N.M. Stat. Ann. §45-1-306 reads as
follows:
If demanded, in the manner provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is
entitled to a trial by jury in a formal testacy proceeding and in any proceeding
and in which any controverted question of fact arises as to which any party has
a constitutional right to trial by jury.
49. Lebeck, supra note 15.
50. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 604 (Ct. App. May 27, 1980).
51. Portillo v. Shappie, 97 N.M. 59, 636 P.2d 878 (1981).
52. For further discussion of Portillo, see Kelsey & Siegel, Domestic Relations, ante at 379.

